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THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH COUNTY COURT 
Stephen .D. "White* 
THE COUNTY COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, 1150-1350. By Rob-
ert C. Palmer. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1982. Pp. 
xvii, 360. $35. 
Before Dr. Robert C. Palmer began his intensive work on the medieval 
English county court, the legal history of this institution had never aroused 
much interest among modem historians of the common law, who wrote 
about it, if at all, only cursorily. Because it was thought that medieval 
county court judgments continued to be rendered by mere landholders, 
long after the time when judicial power in some other courts had been as-
sumed by professionals, the county court could be regarded as a curiosity. 
Its nonprofessional and vaguely democratic character looked backward, 
perhaps, to the era before the Norman conquest of England. Its primary 
role in post-conquest legal history was to suffer certain decline, though not 
a total demise, when it was confronted by the advance of centralized, bu-
reaucratic, professional legal procedures. Because the medieval county 
court eventually took on the task of selecting knights of the shire to sit in 
Parliament, it had some claim on the attention of historians. But as the 
modem study of medieval legal history became almost as specialized and 
professionalized as the medieval legal system itself, that claim on scholarly 
interest, like suit to the old county court, could be discharged by others -
the constitutional (as opposed to legal) historians. 1 
This way of looking ( or sometimes not looking) at the medieval county 
court was recently challenged by Palmer in several impressive articles,2 and 
has now been completely undermined by the arguments set forth in his 
even more impressive book. In this new work, Palmer's objective is to res-
cue the once-despised medieval county court from what E. P. Thompson 
calls "the enormous condescension of posterity."3 But Palmer's rescue 
strategy differs totally from that of recent writers on the past history of 
down-trodden people, marginal cultures, or obsolete institutions, which, 
like the old county court, eventually faded away.4 Palmer wishes to accord 
some dignity to the medieval county court. But this is not because he sees 
• Associate Professor of History, Wesleyan University; Visiting Member, School of His-
torical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, 1982-83 (fall term). A.B. 
1965, Harvard College; Ph.D. 1972, Harvard University. - Ed. 
I. For recent notes on the medieval English county court, with brief biographical refer-
ences, sees. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 13-15 (2d ed. 1981); 
J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 21-25, 32-33 (2d ed. 1979). 
2. See Palmer, County Year Book Reports: The Professional Lawyer in the Medieval County 
Court, 91 ENG. HIST. REV. 776 (1976); Palmer, The Origins of the Legal Profession in England, 
11 IRISH JURIST 126 (1976). 
3. E. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 13 (2d ed. 1968). 
4. On the ultimate demise of the old county court, see J. BAKER, supra note I, at 22. 
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in it, as Thompson now sees in the jury, "a lingering paradigm of an alter-
native mode of participatory self-government" that can rival more up-to-
date paradigms reflecting "the rule over the people by bureaucrats, 'ex-
perts', or a substitutionist vanguard."5 Instead, having found incontrovert-
ible proof, through much reading and analysis, that the medieval county 
court was actually dominated, not by local landholders, but by expert pro-
fessional lawyers, their noble patrons, and royally appointed sheriffs, 
Palmer establishes the importance of this body - if not its dignity - by 
showing that in the long march of English law towards professionalism and 
modernity, the county court stood, at least briefly, in the vanguard. 
In ten closely reasoned chapters, Palmer first argues that the county 
court was run by real professional lawyers,6 and not by those whom he 
regards as "amateurs."7 He further maintains that instead of focusing pri-
marily on the "decline" of this court, legal historians should closely ex-
amine its changing place in the medieval legal system. They should show 
how, by the thirteenth century, this type of court first became integrated 
into a unified judicial structure, or "legal system,"8 but later lost its close 
association with other courts, as the king's court assumed many of its judi-
cial powers (p. 306), and as English judicial organization lost much of its 
earlier unity.9 Palmer also shows how the study of this one species of court 
can illuminate other subjects, such as the origins of the legal profession. 10 
Palmer's work is therefore valuable for its substantive and methodological 
contributions to medieval legal history; and while he does not really sub-
stantiate his insistent claim that the county court generally proceeded fairly 
and justly, this belief of his is not essential to what is, in other respects, a 
convincing and important historical argument. 
Palmer first sets out to discuss ''The Institutional Framework and Per-
sonnel" of the medieval county court (Part I: chs. 1-5). Here, his objective 
is both to answer certain central questions about the workings of county 
courts and to use his answers to challenge received opinions about how 
these judicial bodies really functioned. When and where did the county 
court meet? What role did the sheriff and his subordinates play in this insti-
tution? What sorts of people owed suit to this type of court? And who 
actually served as its judges? Who carried on the work of pleading in the 
5. E. THOMPSON, The Secret State, in WRITING BY CANDLELIGHT 169, 170 (1980). 
6. Palmer considers "a person involved in legal activities a professional lawyer when, for a 
period of years, that person appears to be spending the major part of his time in legal functions 
and deriving the greater part of his income from those activities or, at least, from the invest-
ments made from that income, and when that person possesses a specialized knowledge differ-
entiating him from laymen." P. 89 n.l. 
7. On the claim that the county court was an "amateur" body, see, e.g., pp. 56 & 112. It is 
worth noting that nonprofessionals need not be amateurs. 
8. Although Palmer frequently uses the term "legal system," (see, e.g., pp. xiii, xiv, 141, 
173, 182, 297, 300, 301 & 304), he does not clearly define it. When using this term, he is 
concerned more with the relationship between courts than with the kind of law that courts 
administer. 
9. Thus, in the fifteenth century, Palmer maintains, the English courts did not constitute "a 
legal system." P. 304. 
10. In his two articles, see note 2 supra, Palmer has additional things to say about the 
origins of the legal profession. 
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county court? And what roles did these pleaders play outside this forum? 
Having found new evidence bearing on "every topic of importance" con-
cerning the county court (p. xi), Palmer uses his new findings as elements in 
a complex discussion of medieval English judicature. Thus, his treatment 
of venue and scheduling (ch. 1) really serves an argumentative purpose, as 
well as a purely descriptive one. He finds, for instance, that the timing of 
royal hundred court meetings was not dictated by a provision of the Magna 
Carta calling for meetings every three weeks. It evidently was determined 
instead by the sheriff's wish to coordinate the schedules of these lesser 
courts with the established schedule of county court meetings. From this, 
he can argue, first, that the county court was "the primary royal court" in 
every county, and, second, that careful planning, implemented by the sher-
iff and "a sophisticated staff of competent bailiffs," went into the scheduling 
of county court meetings (p. 27). While one may wonder how much sophis-
tication was really required for the performance of this task, Palmer's find-
ings on this point certainly help him to move toward his goal of showing 
that the county court was under royal control and formed part of an inte-
grated legal system. 
Palmer provides further support for this general thesis in chapter two, 
where he demonstrates_ that some of the county officials who managed 
county court meetings and/ or enforced county court judgments had close 
connections at the royal court. He also tries to justify his own favorable 
judgment on the county court by arguing that the viscontiel bureaucracy, 
composed of the sheriff and his subordinates, was relatively efficient, re-
sponsible and law-abiding. Between 1180 and 1340, he shows, the workings 
of the county courts were shaped by the crown policy of appointing sheriffs 
with close ties to royal government. These men held their offices "for a 
limited time and in a succession of counties" and did not regard them sim-
ply as a source of monetary gain. This appointments policy, he maintains, 
was "vital to the rapid implementation of judicial innovations and the 
avoidance of legal chaos" (p. 31). Palmer acknowledges that sheriffs 
wielded power in the county courts and profited financially from county 
court proceedings (p. 36), and that they sometimes abused their power 
there. But he stresses that their oath of office made them legally liable for 
"unjust and inefficient conduct" (p. 37), that they were sometimes prose-
cuted for breach of these obligations, and that they even had "a vested in-
terest in making the county court operate efficiently and justly" (p. 37). 
Similarly, Palmer first notes that some of the sheriff's underlings 
purchased their offices for fixed fees and thus had a financial incentive to 
take more than what he calls a "fair" profit for their work (pp. 50, 53). But 
he then points out that these men were legally accountable to the sheriff and 
were bound by contract to perform their duties properly. Sometimes they 
w:ere even fined for their failure to honor this obligation (p. 53). These facts 
suggest to Palmer that a sheriff's bailiff normally possessed "a knowledge of 
the law sufficient to fulfill his duties competently, so that he could avoid 
amercement and make a profit" (p. 53). Palmer therefore concludes that 
while the viscontiel bureaucracy was hardly "a faultless servant of the pub-
lic interest," it was probably not "as corrupt as the occasional virulent pro-
test might indicate" (p. 55). One need not share Palmer's sunny view of 
medieval county bureaucracy to appreciate the persuasiveness of the claim 
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that, when viewed from one or perhaps several perspectives, the work of the 
sheriff and his underlings was carried out quite successfully. 
Palmer's claims about the efficiency of the county court's proceedings 
and about its close ties to other judicial bodies are supported in a particu-
larly arresting way by his original and important findings about what sorts 
of people actually judged county court cases. Introducing this exceptionally 
well-argued section of his book (ch. 3), Palmer writes: 
Medieval legal theory, the words of the common law writs, and modern 
legal historians identify suitors as the judges of the county, hundred and 
baronial courts. They had a specific tenurial obligation to attend the court 
and render judgments. . . . Since the obligation of suit was tenurial and 
not based on professional qualifications, the position of the suitors as the 
judges of the lower courts has made the county and hundred courts seem 
irrevocably amateur [and "democratic" (pp. 88, 113)] to the historian .... 
Moreover, it has been assumed that the doctrine, the actual obligation, and 
the consequence of suit of court continued through and well beyond the 
thirteenth century. [P. 56.] 
Moving from a detailed discussion of the Cheshire county court to an anal-
ysis of county courts in general, Palmer tears down this received view. 
He first shows that in Cheshire, a clear distinction was regularly made 
between 'Judges" and "suitors" (p. 60): the former held the real power of 
judging cases, while the latter had only an opportunity to influence the for-
mer's decisions (pp. 64-65). Although 'Judges" and "suitors" thus played 
different roles in county court cases, members of both groups were fulfilling 
generally similar obligations to do "suit" to the county court. This obliga-
tion was normally imposed, not on townships or individual people, but on 
manors, and it could be fulfilled either by the immediate lords of manors or 
by people sent in their place (p. 69). The difference between mere "suitors" 
and 'Judges" (who also did "suit" to the county court) seems to have arisen 
simply from the fact that by ancient custom, some manors were obliged to 
send 'Judges" to the county court, while other manors were bound only to 
provide mere "suitors" (p. 74). The mere "suitors" of the Cheshire county 
court were apparently an obscure lot, about whom little can be learned (p. 
74); but the 'Judges" Palmer skillfully identifies as "the bailiffs or senes-
chals of those who owed suit and were obliged to find a judge" (p. 72). 
After arguing that the Cheshire county court was not "atypical,"11 Palmer 
goes on to show that after about 1270, the duty of suitors to attend the 
county court was allowed to lapse, as this institution itself began to lose 
importance (p. 81 ). Even before that date, however, the county court judges 
had been professionals. In Cheshire and elsewhere, powerful landholders 
had 
a vested interest in maintaining a high level of excellence in the county 
court and in seeing to it that their interests were intelligently and forcefully 
represented. The seneschals and bailiffs were among the most skilled legal' 
people working in the county and they were the logical choice to be judges 
in the county court. [P. 72.] 
Thus, certain political facts, along with a certain sort of logic, determined 
that the medieval county court would not be "a democratic assembly of 
11. P. 74; cf. pp. 74-78. 
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knights of the county."12 
Equally significant for Palmer's overall argument is his discovery that 
real professional lawyers were working in the county courts as pleaders, 
thus performing another complex activity demanding great "legal expertise 
and knowledge" (p. 91). Palmer draws several conclusions from this find-
ing. First, he uses it to question the traditional assumption that professional 
secular lawyers only began to appear in England in around 1200, when they 
can be found practicing in the king's courts. Having found bailiffs and 
seneschals practicing in the county courts in the earlier twelfth century, he 
suggests that these men were "the first secular lawyers in England" and that 
lower courts, like the county court, were actually "more important than the 
king's court in the genesis of the [legal] profession" (p. 136). The finding 
that county court pleading was carried out by professional lawyers also aids 
Palmer's effort to demolish established views about the "amateurism" of 
this court. These lawyers, he finds, were real professionals. Hired on occa-
sion for an individual case (pp. 93, 112), a typical local lawyer was usually 
retained for life by around two dozen clients, each of whom paid him an 
annual fee of up to 20r. (pp. 112; 94-97). These lawyers also served concur-
rently as bailiffs, pledges, undersheriffs, county clerks, sheriffs, members of 
county commissions, and attorneys in the king's court (p. 112). They were 
seen as "specialists, people with uncommon skills, and were paid accord-
ingly" (p. 112). They were not sustained solely by "high professional abil-
ity"; a lawyer's "power was based on the wealth of the aristocrats he served 
as well as on his knowledge of the intricate world of legal technicality" (p. 
89). Since English barons used the county courts and the bailiffs who repre-
sented them and their tenants there to consolidate their own feudal 
power, 13 Palmer can claim that "the county courts embodied the ties be-
tween lord and man" (p. 113). Palmer does not think, however, that the 
county court therefore served only as an instrument of baronial rule. In his 
view, these highly trained, professional clients of medieval nobles made the 
county court "a professional and legally respectable institution, rather than 
the amateur court presented by modem historians." 14 Moreover, the train-
ing and career patterns of these professional lawyers ensured that county 
court proceedings would not be shaped solely or even predominantly by 
local political interests or regional legal traditions. Because these men also 
used their craft in other courts, including the king's court, they created, al-
beit inadvertently, "strong bonds of common legal thought between the dif-
ferent courts of the country" (p. 89). Thus, legal professionalism and royal 
control prevented local magnates from completely dominating the county 
court and made this institution part of a unified legal system. 
In Part II of his study, which treats county court jurisdiction, Palmer 
covers many new topics, but continues to sound the same themes first heard 
in Part I. He again shows that the county court was part of an integrated 
court system, and his claims about the basic fairness of medieval English 
law become more insistent. "One of the most basic principles . . . which 
informed English legal procedures," he says, ''was the principle that a liti-
12. P. 88; cf. p. 90. 
13. See pp. 113-119. 
14. P. 112; cf. pp. 89-90. 
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gant should receive a fair hearing and be accorded the benefits of custom-
ary process" (p. 141).15 Because in certain instances, which he 
enumerates, 16 English courts might tum out to be "irremediably biased" (p. 
141), considerations of fairness required that litigants be allowed to escape 
from a potentially biased court, or else to prosecute a court that had treated 
them unfairly. While conceding that this basic commitment to fairness was 
seldom expressed in medieval England, he still insists that it provided the 
underlying rationale for several processes by which lawsuits could some-
times be transferred into or out of the county court. Toll, pone and the 
grand assize, he thinks, were all "designed to avoid injustice before it had 
occurred" (p. 151), and if a litigant still suffered injustice in a lower court, 
he could, by securing a writ of false judgment, gain access to the king's 
court, where impartial justice, Palmer believes, could be regularly obtained 
(pp. 149-50). Although Palmer cannot really prove that English court pro-
cedures were fair, he can still show that these procedures, along with several 
others, constituted "institutionalized bonds between the courts which ex-
erted constant pressure towards unifying and making common the varying 
customs in England." Thus, procedures like toll and pone contributed to 
the process by which English courts were "welded" into "a legal system" (p. 
173). 
Links between the county courts and the central government are also 
treated in chapter 7, which discusses the so-called viscontiel writs. These 
writs, which were addressed to the sheriff and originated cases in county 
courts (p. 174), became writs de cursu under Henry II (1154-1189). What 
concerns Palmer is why they were instituted at all, when county court cases 
could be initiated without writ, and what effects these writs had on English 
court structure. He finds that the institution of the viscontiel writs served to 
tighten the bonds between the county court and the king's court. He also 
claims that for reasons that he closely examines, at least some oflhe viscon-
tiel writs provided litigants with "better" procedures (p. 182) than were 
otherwise available in the county court and made these procedures avail-
able to more litigants than the king's court could accommodate. Moreover, 
the fact that some of these procedures led to reviews of county court cases 
by the king's court meant that lower court practice was "constantly brought 
before the best legal minds in the county and, if unjustly aberrant, criticized 
and perhaps even ignored in county process" (p. 146). Indeed, Palmer 
claims that "[t]he viscontiel courts were ... [a part] of the reason why the 
common law by 1215 was perceived to be necessary and beneficial to Eng-
land as a whole and not just to the king" (p. 219). 
Palmer next sets out to explain certain interesting changes that had oc-
curred by the fourteenth century in the types of cases handled by county 
courts (ch. 8). By the 1330s, at least some of these courts were apparently 
dealing with "a narrower range of forms of litigation, fewer cases initiated 
by writ, and, in debt, claims for smaller sums" (p. 228). These changes 
suggest that the county courts were declining in importance and becoming 
less closely tied to the king's court. But because Palmer takes the unusual 
but plausible position that litigants may actually have preferred local courts 
15. P. 141; cf. p. 173. 
16. See, e.g., pp. 142-147. 
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to the king's court, he is unwilling to explain this change by making the 
conventional assumption that litigants were eagerly and sensibly by-passing 
the county court and flocking to Westminster. 17 In the end, he argues very 
convincingly that these changes were "the long-term results" of royal in-
quiries in the 1270s into the organization of local government (p. 228). 
Given his favorable view of the county court, he cannot claim, as he does 
when treating the origins of the viscontiel writs, that these changes were 
signs of real progress and instead views them as examples of "the untoward 
influence of statutory action" (p. 220). Nevertheless, he can still incorporate 
these developments into his general argument by treating them as examples 
of "the complicated and highly technical coordination of the king's court 
with the local courts" (p. 220). 
A final expository chapter (ch. 9) treats the county court's changing rela-
tionship to other judicial bodies. Within the county itself, he finds, the 
county court held a position of superiority, which it did not lose after 1300, 
even though there were shifts in its relationship to liberties, courts of an-
cient demesne and lesser courts without the franchise of return of writs (pp. 
286, 296). Nevertheless, the county court's relationship to the king's court 
altered so that the position of the former in English court structure changed 
as well. The establishment of the nisi prius system, he argues, drove a 
"wedge ... between the county courts and the king's court, each function-
ing more and more without reference to the other" (p. 228), while the gen-
eral eyre disrupted county litigation (p. 289) and did damage to county 
litigants (p. 291). As the county court and the king's court drifted apart in 
· most respects, the election of the knights of the shire to sit in the court of 
Parliament became the county court's "most important prerogative" (p. 
294). The county court could still perform this function because it still em-
bodied "the community of the county" (p. 296). For Palmer, therefore, a 
court dominated by lawyers, who represented barons, and by sheriffs, who 
represented the king, also represented a county community, whose nature 
and composition Palmer leaves mysteriously undefined. In a carefully ar-
gued conclusion (ch. 10), Palmer suggests that when studying medieval ju-
dicial organization from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, it is less 
useful to show that a court was gaining or losing power, relative to the 
king's court, than it is to determine "the degree to which the various courts 
in England were bound together into a legal system." Historians should 
therefore focus on the process of "curial integration" (p. 297). 
Through his own work on the county court, he has found that the his-
tory of this process falls into two distinct phases. Down to the reign of 
Edward I (1272-1307), English courts became bound together so as to con-
stitute a real "legal system," but in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
"the bonds that unified the courts were soon broken or even served to iso-
late the courts from one another" (p. 302). In the process of "curial integra-
tion," he claims, the most powerful moving forces were not people, but 
legal procedures, like the ones set in motion by the viscontiel writs. Never-
theless, sheriffs and lawyers also played a significant, if unconscious, role in 
linking different courts together. Palmer also shows that the energy sus-
taining the process of curial integration did not all come from the king's 
17. See pp. 220-24. 
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court; sometimes, the impetus for this process came from the procedures or 
personnel of the counties (p. 301). Palmer thus suggests that conventional 
ways of picturing medieval legal change need to be revised so as to take 
account of the fact that the king's court at Westminster was not the only 
dynamic element in medieval legal culture. 
Palmer's book is valuable and important for several reasons. It presents 
some novel substantive findings about medieval county courts and proposes 
some interesting new ways of approaching the history of medieval judicial 
organization. It also identifies many different forces that shaped the legal 
history of the county court: royal efforts to control local life; the political 
appetites of local magnates; the bureaucratic skills, financial interests, legal 
obligations and political ties of county officials; the professional skills, ca-
reer patterns and political interests of lawyers; and a commitment to impar-
tial justice. While he never really explains precisely why these different 
forces combined to produce curial integration in one segment of the middle 
ages and curial disintegration in another, he successfully shows how these 
forces, down to about 1270, served to make English judicial organization 
more unified. He is less successful, I think, in his efforts to show that these 
forces - rather like the ones represented in pluralist models of democratic 
politics - either neutralized each other or else worked harmoniously to-
gether so as to create courts that would generally render "fair" and 'Just" 
decisions. 
Perhaps the clearest reason why this part of his argument is unconvinc-
ing is that he does not look seriously at contemporary statements about how 
unfair or unjust the English courts could be. To support his contention that 
the king's court was impartial, he quotes, without comment or qualification, 
G/anvill's assertion that "His Highness's court is ... impartial" (pp. 149-
50). But after quoting a biting remark from Fleta about how seneschals 
exerted undue influence on local court proceedings, Palmer claims that "[i]t 
is doubtful, of course, that the seneschals were all that corrupt" (p. 120). 
Evidently, Palmer sees no point in quoting other passages in which contem-
poraries questioned the fairness of English courts, or queried the honesty 
and good intentions of lawyers, judges or local officials. 
In an elaborate passage likening the king's court (in the broad sense of 
the term) to hell, the late-twelfth-century satirist Walter Map had this to say 
about the viscontiel bureaucracy and the oaths taken by those who be-
longed to it: 
There are sent . . . from the court those whom it styleth sheriffs, under-
sheriffs, beadles, whose duty it is to pry cunningly. These men leave noth-
ing untouched, nothing untried, and, like bees, they light on flowers to 
draw forth some of the honey: they punish what is innocuous, but the belly 
goeth clear of punishment. And yet, at the outset of their office, in the 
presence of the highest judge, they do swear to serve faithfully and hon-
estly God and their master, rendering to Caesar the things that are Cae-
sar's, to God the things that are God's; but bribes pervert them so that they 
tear the fleece from the lambs, leaving the foxes unharmed, inasmuch as 
they win favour by their money, knowing that "giving requireth 
ingenuity."18 
18. w. MAP, DE Nums CURIALUM (COURTIERS' TRIFLES) 7 (F. Tupper & M. Ogle trans. 
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Later, speaking of the royal court whose "impartiality" Glanvill Iauds, Map 
observes: 
A ye, the king in this court is like the husband who is the last to know the 
sin of his wife. The courtiers silly [sic] send him forth to sport among birds 
and hounds to prevent his seeing what they do within during his absence. 
While they make him take his sport, they themselves are busy with serious 
matters; they sit upon their tribunals and bring both righteousness and un-
righteousness to the same judgment. When, however, the king retumeth 
from his hunting or his hawking, he showeth his spoils to them and giveth 
them a share; they do not disclose theirs to him. 19 
Perhaps these pointed remarks by a skilled satirist should be treated by 
legal historians as inadmissible evidence. But here are some remarks on 
local justice by the author of an early twelfth-century legal treatise that 
Palmer uses from time to time.20 In a passage with direct bearing on the 
issues most central to Palmer's argument, the author of the Leges Henrici 
Primi observed of the county court in the reign of Henry I (1100-1135): 
"The laws of the counties themselves differ very often from shire to shire, 
according as the rapacity and the evil and hateful practices oflawyers have 
introduced into the legal system more serious ways of inflicting injury."21 
After continuing in this vein, the same author concluded: ''The vexations 
of secular legal proceedings are beset by wretched anxieties of such number 
and magnitude, and are enveloped in so many fraudulences, that these 
processes and the quite unpredictable hazard of the courts seem rather 
things to be avoided."22 
What are the legal historians to make of such "occasional but virulent 
protest[s]" (p. 55)? Palmer's method, it seems, is to dismiss them as summa-
rily as earlier legal historians dismissed the medieval county court, or else 
to treat them as warily as a lawyer would treat a hostile or lunatic witness. 
In his generally successful and often brilliant effort to write a balanced, 
judicious and inipeccably documented history of the medieval county court, 
he feels it necessary to dismiss manifestly unbalanced statements of some 
contemporary observers. The county court, he suggests, could not, "of 
course" (p. 120), have been as unfair and unjust as people like Walter Map, 
the author of Fleta, or the author of the Leges said it was. Perhaps not. But 
why not adopt a more straightforward and less dutifully judicious position 
and take more account of the fact that some medieval people (who knows 
how many?) thought that it was? Even those of us who take this position, 
however, should be grateful to Dr. Palmer for having done so much to illu-
minate the workings - fair or unfair - of the medieval county court. 
1924). This passage comes from the chapter "On Night Birds," which begins by discussing 
people at the royal court whom Map likens to "the owl, night-hawk, vulture, bubo, whose eyes 
the darkness love and hate the light." 
19. Id at 320. 
20. See pp. 78-80, 113-29, 151. 
21. LEGES HENRICl PRIMIC. 6, 3a, 99 (L. Downer ed. & trans. 1972). 
22. Id 
